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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:11 pm
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Results for search and seizure
8 results foundAuthor: Steward, Dwight Title: Don't Mind If I Take a Look, Do Ya? An Examination of Consent Searches and Contraband Hit Rates at Texas Traffic Stops Summary: With the passage of Texas Senate Bill 1074 (S.B. 1074) in 2001, law enforcement agencies must now annually report detailed statistics concerning the race of individuals who are stopped and searched in their jurisdictions. For this study, reports from 1,060 agencies were collected, with a focus on search and contraband data. Specifically, analyses were conducted of total search figures, consent search figures, and contraband figures to determine if racial disparities existed – if so, such would indicate the targeting of certain racial groups for selective enforcement. Particular attention was given to examining potential racial disparities in consent searches, thereby eliminating from the analysis searches which may be outside of an officer’s discretion. Analyses of search data – combined with contraband hit rate data – would also help gauge the efficiency and legitimacy of current police practices. The entire dataset collected for this study includes several million police-civilian contacts representing the majority of traffic stops in Texas. This report analyzes each contributing agency’s self-reported statistics, as well as the quality of the reports produced, in order to better inform policy leaders, law enforcement agencies, and community members as they address the problem and the perception of racial profiling. This is the largest set of racial profiling data that has ever been collected and analyzed, and it is the first inter-department review of contraband data collected by Texas law enforcement agencies. The goals of this report are three-fold: • Analyze the racial distribution of total searches, consent searches, and contraband hit rates in Texas using self-reported data submitted by police and sheriff’s departments. • Review the quality of the racial profiling data collected and reported by law enforcement agencies. • Recommend solutions to better analyze and monitor racial profiling figures and deter ineffective law enforcement practices. Key Findings include the following: (1) Texas law enforcement agencies continue to search Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos: approximately 2 out of 3 agencies reported searching Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop. 66% of agencies searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos, while 69% of agencies searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos. (2) Of the agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates often, 7 out of 10 (71%) searched Blacks at least 50% more frequently than they searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Blacks. Of the agencies that searched Latinos at higher rates, 9 out of 10 (90%) searched Latinos at least 50% more frequently than they searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Latinos. (3) Consent searches – performed without any legal basis to search – contributed significantly to general search disparities: approximately 3 out of 5 agencies reported consent searching Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop. 61% of agencies consent searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos, while 59% of agencies consent searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos. (4) Of the agencies that consent searched Blacks at higher rates often, 3 out of 4 (75%) consent searched Blacks at least 50% more frequently than they consent searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Blacks. Of the agencies that consent searched Latinos at higher rates, 3 out of 4 (74%) consent searched Latinos at least 50% more frequently than they consent searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Latinos. (5) Patterns of over-searching Blacks and Latinos are consistent. Approximately 3 out of 4 agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos also searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos (75%), while 3 out of 5 agencies that consent searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos also consent searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos (61%). (6) Of the agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates, 51% were likely to find contraband in the possession of Anglos at higher rates than Blacks – meaning Anglos and Blacks were equally likely to be found with contraband. Of the agencies that searched Latinos at higher rates, 58% were likely to find contraband in the possession of Anglos at higher rates than Latinos – meaning Anglos were slightly more likely than Latinos to be found with contraband. (7) Racial disparities in search rates appear to be growing. Approximately 3 out of 5 agencies reported searching Blacks or Latinos at higher rates in 2003 than 2002 (60%). Note: this figure includes agencies with any increase in rates for Blacks or Latinos from 2002 to 2003. (8) The vast majority of agencies provided no mitigating information or insight to explain disparate search rates between Anglos and minorities, nor did contraband hit rates suggest efficient law enforcement practices were being utilized. (9) Auditing of data is non-existent or unreliable. Over half of agencies did not report using any data auditing procedures or audio-video review to ensure against human errors, technical errors, or data falsification. (10) Imprecision in both data quality and reporting restricts the usefulness of analysis. Ultimately, the lack of a generally accepted uniform reporting standard limited the accuracy of analysis involved for some reports filed by law enforcement agencies. Initial findings show that Blacks and Latinos in Texas communities are more likely to be searched, though Anglos are equally likely or more likely to be found with contraband during searches. High minority search rates are particularly evident in the area of consent searches – where searches cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or outstanding warrants. Without some explanation of mitigating factors by law enforcement agencies, this would indicate that police are not only engaging in race-based policing but are ineffectively and inefficiently utilizing law enforcement resources. Agencies should identify and authenticate legitimate law enforcement practices that may be contributing to racial disparities in their data. Furthermore, in the absence of an explanation for disparate search and contraband rates, law enforcement leadership and policy-makers should take steps to monitor and reduce race-based policing. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Criminal Justice Colition, 2005. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/publicsafety/racial_profiling_report_2005.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/publicsafety/racial_profiling_report_2005.pdf Shelf Number: 121457 Keywords: Consent SearchesContrabandIllegal GoodsPolice DiscretionRacial DisparitiesRacial Profiling (Texas)Search and SeizureTraffic Stops |
Author: Smith, Alison M. Title: Law Enforcement Use of Global Positioning (GPS) Devices to Monitor Motor Vehicles: Fourth Amendment Considerations Summary: As technology continues to advance, what was once thought novel, even a luxury, quickly becomes commonplace, even a necessity. Global Positioning System (GPS) technology is one such example. Generally, GPS is a satellite-based technology that discloses the location of a given object. This technology is used in automobiles and cell phones to provide individual drivers with directional assistance. Just as individuals are finding increasing applications for GPS technology, state and federal governments are as well. State and federal law enforcement use various forms of GPS technology to obtain evidence in criminal investigations. For example, federal prosecutors have used information from cellular phone service providers that allows real-time tracking of the locations of customers’ cellular phones. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1958 (P.L. 90-351) regulates the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. As such, it does not regulate the use of GPS technology affixed to vehicles and is beyond the scope of this report. The increased reliance on GPS technology raises important societal and legal considerations. Some contend that law enforcement’s use of such technology to track motor vehicles’ movements provides for a safer society. Conversely, others have voiced concerns that GPS technology could be used to reveal information inherently private. Defendants on both the state and federal levels are raising Fourth Amendment constitutional challenges, asking the courts to require law enforcement to first obtain a warrant before using GPS technology. Subject to a few exceptions, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before conducting a search or making a seizure. Courts continue to grapple with the specific issue of whether law enforcement’s use of GPS technology constitutes a search or seizure, as well as the broader question of how the Constitution should address advancing technology in general. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether law enforcement’s use of GPS technology in connection with motor vehicles falls within the Fourth Amendment’s purview. Lower federal courts have relied on Supreme Court precedent to arrive at arguably varying conclusions. For example, several district and circuit courts of appeals have concluded that law enforcement’s current use of GPS technology does not constitute a search, and is thus permissible, under the Constitution. To date, while the U.S. Supreme Court has not provided a definitive answer regarding law enforcement’s use of GPS technology, state legislatures and courts have approached the issue in various ways. Some states have enacted laws requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before using GPS technology. Some state courts have resolved the question under their own constitutions. Although they have reached somewhat differing conclusions, other state courts have relied on Supreme Court precedent, such as United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), to derive an answer. This report discusses the basics of GPS technology, society’s reliance on it, and some of the related legal and privacy implications. In addition, the report examines legislative and judicial responses on both federal and state levels. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R41663: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41663.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41663.pdf Shelf Number: 121707 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationFourth AmendmentGlobal Positioning DevicesSearch and SeizureTechnology |
Author: Slogogin, Christopher Title: A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases Summary: The modern United States Supreme Court views the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring police conduct that unduly infringes privacy or autonomy interests. But in years past the Court also proffered two other reasons for exclusion: the importance of ensuring the integrity of the legal system (primarily by avoiding judicial complicity with police illegality) and the need to vindicate constitutional guarantees. Some version of one or both of the latter two rationales also appears to be the primary motivation behind the exclusionary rules in other countries. In contrast to the United States, however, in most of these countries exclusion is not very common. Those countries that focus on systemic integrity take into account not only the de-legitimizing impact of failing to exclude illegally seized evidence but also the truth-denigrating effect of excluding evidence. Those countries that focus on vindicating fundamental rights tend to define those rights narrowly, or undercut the vindication rationale in various other ways. After describing these developments, this paper examines, from both empirical and theoretical perspectives, the difficulties that arise in applying the deterrence, systemic integrity,and rights vindication models of the rule and concludes with thoughts about the possible alternatives to exclusion, the ways in which the exclusionary remedy can be refined, and the interaction of the exclusionary rule with substantive search and seizure law. Details: Nashville, TC: Vanderbilt University Law School, 2013. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Vanderbilt University Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Number 13-21: Accessed May 9, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247746 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247746 Shelf Number: 128688 Keywords: Criminal LawExclusionary RulePolice MisconductSearch and Seizure |
Author: McAdams, Richard Title: The Law of Police Summary: Some Fourth Amendment doctrines distinguish between searches executed by police and others, being more demanding of the former. We explore these distinctions by offering a simple theory for how "police are different," focusing on self-selection. Those most attracted to the job of policing include those who feel the most intrinsic satisfaction from facilitating the punishment of wrongdoers. Thus, we expect police to have more intensely punitive preferences, on average, than the public or other governmental actors. Some experimental evidence supports this prediction. In turn, stronger punishment preferences logically lower one's threshold of doubt- the perceived probability of guilt at which one would search or seize a suspect. That police have a lower threshold of doubt plausibly justifies more judicial scrutiny of police searches than of non-police searches (as well as more-permissive rules when police perform tasks outside the scope of law enforcement). We also consider and critique Bill Stuntz's alternative explanation of the relevant doctrine. Details: Chicago: University of Chicago Law School, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers no. 505: Accessed April 22, 2015 at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1955&context=public_law_and_legal_theory Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1955&context=public_law_and_legal_theory Shelf Number: 135360 Keywords: Fourth AmendmentPolice Behavior (U.S.)Search and Seizure |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: The US legal system on data protection in the field of law enforcement. Safeguards, rights and remedies for EU citizens Summary: In US law, there are a number of different legal sources that govern data protection in the field of federal law enforcement. This study first considers the two most important sources of data protection law-the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974. It then turns to the most significant methods of information collection that are available for ordinary criminal investigations and national security investigations and the data protection guarantees set down under the laws authorizing and regulating such information collection. The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government. Reasonableness is established if the search or seizure is conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, that is, a judicial order based on a showing of probable cause and on a particular description of the property to be searched and the items to be seized. Reasonableness can also be established if one of the exceptions to the warrant requirements exists. In the data protection context, however, the application of the Fourth Amendment is relatively limited because of the third-party records doctrine which holds that individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in personal data that they voluntarily turn over to third parties like financial institutions and communications providers. With regard to EU citizens, the Supreme Court has held that foreign citizens resident abroad are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Among U.S. laws, the Privacy Act of 1974 is the closest analogue to a European data protection law in that it seeks to regulate comprehensively personal data processing, albeit only with respect to federal government departments and agencies. It regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal information, by all types of federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. At a general level, the Privacy Act contains most of the elements of the EU right to personal data protection. However, it only protects US citizens and permanent residents, not EU citizens. Furthermore, there are a number of exemptions available specifically for law enforcement agencies. As a result, the benefits of the proposed legislation on judicial redress for EU citizens are unclear. The proposed legislation contemplates three types of law suits, two of which are designed to protect the right of access to and correction of personal data, and one of which enables individuals to obtain compensation for unlawful disclosures of personal data. Since law enforcement agencies commonly exempt their data bases from the access requirements of the Privacy Act, the right of action for intentional or willful disclosures that cause actual damage is the only one that would be available on a general basis. In investigations involving ordinary crime, there are at least three different methods of personal data collection available to law enforcement officials: (1) use of private sources like commercial data brokers; (2) court and administrative subpoenas; (3) electronic surveillance and access to electronic communications based on a court order under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. These information-gathering methods afford the same level of data protection for US and EU citizens. With respect to EU data protection law, however, some of these methods contain relatively few data protection guarantees. In the case of private sources of personal data, this is attributable to the absence of a comprehensive data protection scheme in the private sector and the vast quantities of personal information freely available to market actors and, consequently, also to law enforcement officials. With respect to the subpoena power and access to communications metadata and subscriber records (under the Stored Communications Act and the Pen Register Act), the lack of significant data protection guarantees is associated with the standard of "relevance" to any type of criminal investigation and the permissive application of that standard by the courts. The law and jurisprudence of "relevance," in turn, is driven by the failure of US law to recognize a robust privacy interest in the personal data held by corporate entities and other third parties. In investigations involving national security threats, which can involve both an intelligence and a law enforcement component, there are a number of additional means available to the government: (1) a special type of administrative subpoena known as a "national security letter"; (2) surveillance authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); (3) any other form of intelligence gathering authorized by Executive Order 12,333 (and not covered by FISA). The information gathered through such methods can be shared with criminal prosecutors if relevant for law enforcement purposes. Foreign intelligence gathering, both inside and outside the United States, follows a two-track scheme, one for US persons and another for non-US persons. With the exception of FISA electronic and physical surveillance orders, the data protection guarantees afforded to non-US persons are minimal. The stated intent of Presidential Policy Directive 28 is to provide for stronger personal data protection for non-US persons, but it is difficult to come to any conclusions at this point in time on what effect it will have. More generally, even with respect to US persons, personal data protection under foreign intelligence law raises a couple of questions. The first concerns the point in time when the right to privacy is burdened by government action. The US government has suggested that in the case of bulk collection of personal data, harm to the privacy interest only occurs after the personal data is used to search, or results from a search of, the information included in the data base. This position stands in marked contrast with EU law, where it is well established that bulk collection, even before the personal data is accessed, is a serious interference with the right to personal data protection because of the number of people and the amount of personal data involved. The second question concerns the conditions under which personal data can be shared between intelligence and law enforcement officials. In the realm of data processing by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the European courts have emphasized that intrusive surveillance can only be conducted to combat serious threats that are carefully defined in law. They have also held that the information that results from such surveillance can only be used to combat those serious threats, whether to take national security measures or to prosecute the associated criminal offenses. In US law, by contrast, the law allows for intelligence to be transferred to the police and criminal prosecutors for any type of law enforcement purpose.. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2015 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 137049 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsData ProtectionFourth AmendmentIntelligence GatheringPrivacy Act of 1974Search and Seizure |
Author: Scotland. Advisory Group on Stop and Search Title: The report of the Advisory Group on Stop and Search Summary: 27. Stop and search is an area of policing that requires constant scrutiny and oversight. It involves the use of police enforcement powers or practices that can affect general public attitudes to policing. If used proportionately and in a targeted manner, with positive outcomes by way of prohibited items being found, it can assist with public confidence. If not, it can undermine attitudes to the police, especially in deprived areas where the tactic has been used a great deal on children and young men. "Policing by consent" relies on the support and confidence of the public throughout the country, and is no less important in such areas where so much crime happens. 28. Stop and search is important but represents only a small part of policing. It has received considerable attention, in particular because of the excessive use of non-statutory stop and search. Non-statutory stop and search lacks any legal framework and is of questionable lawfulness and legitimacy, with poor accountability. 29. There are a number of complicated issues regarding consent in the context of policing, and specifically in the context of police search. In non-statutory stop and search, concerns have been expressed about how genuine and informed any "consent" has been, in view of the age and vulnerabilities of some of the individuals being asked to consent, especially given the perceived imbalance in power between the police and public. 30. Our key recommendations are that there should be a statutory Code of Practice, that the Code should be consulted on before implementation, that there should be early consultation on whether the police should have a power to search children under 18 for alcohol, that there should be a detailed implementation and training plan and that stop and search should end at the point that the Code of Practice comes into effect. We also make recommendations about data gathering, a legislative change to ensure the rights of the child are fully considered and we recommend that discussions take place between the relevant organisations on the most appropriate ways to deal with vulnerable children and adults. 31. We recommend that a statutory Code of Practice should be issued dealing with all aspects of stop and search by Police Scotland. The Code should be issued by the Scottish Ministers, subject to Parliamentary oversight prior to commencement. Thereafter the Code should be kept under review at regular intervals, again subject to Parliamentary oversight on revision. 32. We recommend that use of non-statutory stop and search should end when the Code of Practice is introduced. The group are not unanimous on this point. A minority of members preferred a precautionary approach that would wait, allow recent changes by Police Scotland to bed in, gather more evidence and ensure that there would be no unintended consequences to ending consensual search. I have attempted to in part address these concerns by recommending a period of transition and consultation. 33. A substantial focus of our work was on trying to identify any gaps in police powers, should consensual stop and search end. The majority in the group are satisfied that no significant gaps would exist. We found that officers have often relied on consensual search where other statutory and more appropriate ways to intervene existed. We recommend that before consensual stop and search ends there should be a detailed implementation plan that includes training for officers to make them better aware of the statutory powers that they have. 34. The main gap highlighted to us by the Police was the ability to search children under 18 for alcohol. We have not been able to form a concluded view on whether a gap in powers exists that could not be dealt with by existing powers, and also on whether a power to search children for alcohol would be desirable. We therefore recommend that there should be a public consultation that involves children and young people. The sheer scale of the activity around alcohol underlines Police Scotland"s view that this continues to be an area of concern and the inability to use search powers to remove alcohol from young people is a potential problem. We therefore recommend that this should be considered separately, subject to wider consultation, specifically involving children and young people. 35. If non-statutory stop and search is ended, officers of Police Scotland will still be able to carry out their duties effectively. Abolition will not result in any significant gaps. Specifically, officers will still be able to respond to any welfare or protection issues they encounter. Action will still be possible even when required on an emergency basis, whether carried out by police officers, social workers, medical staff or others. Details: Edinburgh: Advisory Group on Stop and Search, 2015. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00484527.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00484527.pdf Shelf Number: 137328 Keywords: Police AccountabilityPolice DiscretionSearch and SeizureStop and Search |
Author: New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board Title: Crossing the Threshold: An Evaluation of Civilian Complaints of Improper Entries and Searches by the NYPD from January 2010 to October 2015 Summary: Police search and seizure-especially of homes-represents one of the most invasive forms of intrusion of individual liberty. When conducted without proper constitutional authority, home searches are one of the most serious violations of privacy and, consequently, types of police misconduct that engender anger at and distrust of police authority. Entries are fraught with a range of potential dangers to both civilians and officers. Many officers enter homes early in the morning when occupants are sleeping, in a state of undress, and engaged in the private routines in preparation for the day ahead-often leaving residents and their children frightened, confused, and angry. Police officers find themselves in chaotic and potentially dangerous situations, with an unknown number of occupants in the home and limited knowledge of what they will encounter. Even when done lawfully, police entries are forceful, aggressive and surprising, intended to apprehend suspects and seize evidence of a crime. Data compiled by CCRB indicates that most officers in the New York Police Department (the "NYPD" or "Department") enter homes to respond to crimes-in-progress, to render aid to residents, or pursuant to valid search or arrest warrants. Yet the cost of loss of confidence in the presumption of lawful conduct as a result of the cohort of improper entries and searches far outweighs their modest prevalence. Not only are core civil liberties violated, but the necessary constructive relationship between community members and the police is degraded. The community's tolerance for law enforcement activity and compliance with the law rises and falls upon its sense of police legitimacy and authority. Where officers fail to act in accordance with the law requiring procedural and substantive warrant requirements, civilians lose trust and confidence in the police. A lack of procedural justice contributes to a perception that police ignore the law's constraints. To understand the nature and scope of civilian complaints regarding police search and seizure at premises, the CCRB conducted a study of over five and a half years of fully investigated complaints. The CCRB is the largest police oversight agency in the nation and is empowered to receive, investigate, make findings and recommend action upon complaints by New Yorkers alleging misconduct by NYPD officers. See NYC Charter 440(c)(1). To further this mission, CCRB issues monthly, biannual, and special statistical and qualitative reports analyzing trends and recurring issues arising from the many thousands of civilian complaints it receives. These reports act as a barometer of police-civilian encounters in a number of ways, including the police practices that civilians find most troubling. In its role as an independent investigator of misconduct allegations, CCRB is uniquely positioned to identify the circumstances that generate civilian complaints, to assess whether officer conduct is improper, and to offer recommendations to redress misconduct. Details: New York: The Complaint Review Board, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2018 at: http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/issue_based/20160219_entry-search-report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/issue_based/20160219_entry-search-report.pdf Shelf Number: 150360 Keywords: Civilian ComplaintsPolice BehaviorPolice MisconductPolice-Civilian InteractionsSearch and Seizure |
Author: Hales, Gavin Title: Stop and search and knife crime revisited: a small piece of the bigger picture Summary: Last year I wrote a blog on 'what we know and what we don't' about the links between stop and search and knife crime in London. At that time, there were signs that knife crime was increasing after a period of falls, and a number of commentators connected that to the very large reduction seen in the use of stop and search by around three quarters from a peak in 2011. In October 2015, Theresa May, then Home Secretary, used a speech to the National Black Police Association to refute any link between falls in the use of stop and search and rising knife crime, stating: "when you look at the evidence, when you look at places like London where stop and searches have fallen the most, you see that in fact that reduction has nothing to do with knife crime. In London, so-called blade or point stops where officers suspect the individual is carrying a knife accounted for less than one per cent of the reduction in stops and searches by the Metropolitan Police in the last year. "The greatest reductions in London have actually been in stop and searches related to drugs and stolen property, of which there were 77,000 fewer this year four-fifths of the total fall in stops and searches. So it is simply not true that knife crime is rising because the police are no longer stopping and searching those carrying knives." Details: London: The Police Foundation, 2016. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2019 at: http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/2016/12/stop-and-search-and-knife-crime-revisited-a-small-piece-of-the-bigger-picture/ Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/2016/12/stop-and-search-and-knife-crime-revisited-a-small-piece-of-the-bigger-picture/ Shelf Number: 154672 Keywords: Knife CrimeSearch and SeizureStop and Search |